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AUSTRALIA'S UPDATED FRANCHISE
CODE OF CONDUCT: DOES AN EXPRESS
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH BENEFIT
THE FRANCHISOR OR FRANCHISEE?
Natalie Sears*
I. INTRODUCTION
USTRALIA regulates its franchising operations more heavily
than most other countries through the enforcement of its
Franchising Code of Conduct ("the Code").' The Code became
a mandatory Industry Code under the Competition and Consumer Act
2010.2 It aims to inform local franchisees by disclosing details regarding
their rights and obligations under a franchise agreement, including disclo-
sure, contractual, and dispute resolution rights.3 The Code is enforced by
the Australian Competitor and Consumer Commission and seeks to pro-
vide guidance to people interested in entering a franchising relationship.
4
The most recent revision to the Code occurred in 2010, but since then, the
number of business format franchises has grown by over 3,000 units.
5
Growth within the franchising industry has led to increased unfair trade
practices, an issue exacerbated by the imbalance of power inherent in the
franchisor/franchisee relationship. Unfair trade practices were a growing
concern for the Australian Commonwealth Government while revising
the Franchising Code in 2009.6 On January 4, 2013, the Australian Gov-
ernment announced another review of the Franchising Code to be con-
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1. See Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth)
(Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2010CO0457/.
2. Complying with the Franchising Code of Conduct Franchising, BUSINESS.GOV.AU,
http://www.business.gov.au/BusinessTopics/Franchising/Buyinganewfranchise/




5. LoRiI-E FRAZER, ScolrT WEAVIN & KEuLL Booby, FRANCHISING AUSTRALIA
2012 12 (2012) available at http://www.australianfranchising.com.au/downloads/
FranchisingAustraliaSurvey-2012.pdf.
6. OPPOITUNrry NOT OPPORTUNISM: IMPROVING CONDUCT IN AUSTRALIAN
FRANCrISING 2-3(2009) [hereinafter OPPORTJNITY NOT OPPORTUNISM], available
at http://www.innovation.gov.au/SmallBusiness/CodesOfConduct/Documents/
GovernmentresponseFranchising.pdf.
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ducted by Mr. Alan Wein. Mr. Wein earned a Law Institute of Victoria
(LIV) practicing certificate and is an accredited mediator with the Aus-
tralian mediation organizations LIV and LEADR, having also gained ex-
perience as a mediator in the Office of the Franchising Mediation Adviser
(OFMA).7 In addition, Mr. Wein was appointed as the inaugural chair of
the Victorian government's Small Business Advisory Council in 2000.8
The short three-year gap between Code revisions is evidence of the Aus-
tralian Government's ability and tendency to implement new provisions
in the Code more efficiently than other countries, such as the United
States. 9
After Mr. Wein provided his recommendations, the Australian Govern-
ment announced its response on July 24, 2013 and accepted, in full or in
principle, most of his proposals. 10 Among the most anticipated and dis-
puted provisions included the accepted recommendation for an express
obligation of good faith." The duty of good faith can permeate a
franchise agreement in three different ways: "as an express term of the
contract, as a term implied in fact on an ad hoc basis to give business
efficacy to the contract, or as a term implied in law as a necessary incident
of the contract."'1 2 A default option is that the duty of good faith can be
applied to all common law contract principles, regardless of whether such
language is present within the franchising agreement.' 3 Prior to the Aus-
tralian Government's amendment to the Code, a conflict existed in the
nation's case law as to whether any of the above options fit within their
common law jurisdiction. 14
II. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
The Australian Government's acceptance of Recommendation 9, an
"express obligation to act in good faith," extends to most phases of the
franchise relationship, including the negotiation and performance of the
parties' agreement, performance of the Code's requirements, and resolu-
tion of disputes between the franchisor and franchisee.' 5
7. Franchising Code of Conduct, AUSTL. Gov'T DEP'T OF INDUS., http://www.innova-
tion.gov.au/smallbusiness/codesofconduct/Pages/FranchisingCodeofConduct.aspx
(last visited Mar. 18, 2014); Alan Wein, LLB, Ausri. Gov'T DiWT or INDUS.,
http://www.innovation.gov.au/smallbusiness/codesofconduct/Pages/AlanWeinLLB.
aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
8. Id.
9. Rupert M. Barkoff, A Look at Franchise Regulation from Ground Level to 30,000
Feet, 32 FRANCIciisu L.J. 153, 155 (2013).
10. Press Release, Austl. Gov't, Government to Strengthen $130 Billion Franchising
Sector (July 24, 2013), available at http://www.franchise.org.au/articles/govern-
ment-to-strengthen-130-billion-franchising-sector.html.
11. GARY GRAY & BERNIE RipoiPi, FORWARD LOOKING FRANCHISING REGULATION
4 (2013), available at http://www.innovation.gov.au/smallbusiness/codesofconduct/
Documents/GovernmentResponsetoFranchisingCodereview.pdf.
12. Andrew Terry & Cary Di Lernia, Franchising and the Quest for the Holy Grail:
Good Faith or Good Intentions?, 33 MELB. U.L. Ru:v. 542, 546 (2009).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 546-47.
15. GRAY & RiPOLL, supra, note 11 at 13.
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Legal scholars and courts have debated whether a duty of good faith
should be applied to franchise agreements at all. Some courts believe
that an express duty of good faith runs afoul of the economic principle of
caveat emptor. 16 Other courts have stated that such a duty would rarely
entice franchisors and franchisees to actually comply or cooperate with
the standards required of good faith behavior. 17 For example, in Butt v.
McDonald, Chief Justice Griffith wrote that "a general rule [applies] to
every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things
as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit
of the contract."' 18 The Australian High Court subsequently affirmed this
idea in Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v. St Martins Invest-
ments Pty Ltd.1 9 Legal scholars in the United States have addressed this
issue by critiquing the common assumption that franchisees consider all
relevant information before signing franchise agreements. 20 Many schol-
ars find that franchisees' lack of business experience and knowledge hin-
der their ability to consider relevant information before opening a
franchise unit, and are thus more susceptible to franchisor abuse.
2 1
The Australian Government previously addressed whether to add an
express obligation of good faith, but believed such an obligation should
only be included in the Code "as long as the scope of this obligation is
well defined."122 The government stated specific concerns related to en-
acting a good faith requirement that included potential increases in the
risks, costs, and financing of franchising operations. 23 The Government
was also concerned that a broad definition of good faith would inhibit
franchisors' or franchisees' ability to recognize when a breach of that duty
occurred.24 It also worried that franchisees would be at a comparative
disadvantage because they have less access to legal advice than
franchisors. In addition, the Government believed an express obligation
of good faith would result in franchisees having to pay increased fees to
compensate for franchisors increased risk in the uncertainty of such a
provision in the Code.2 5
Although civil law jurisdictions consistently apply the good faith stan-
dard to contract law, which controls franchising agreements, common law
jurisdictions such as Australia are not as consistent in applying such a
16. GiLES CONSULTING INT'L, Du-ry oF GooD FAIi BACKGROUND BRIEFING PAPER
15 (2012), available at http://www.innovation.gov.au/smallbusiness/codesofconduct/
Documents/Lottery%20Agents%2OAssociation%20of%20Victoria%2OAttach
ment.pdf.
17. Marilyn Warren, Good Faith: Where Are We At?, 34 MELB. U.L. REV. 344, 349-50.
18. Id. at 349 n.32 (quoting Butt v. McDonald, 7 QLJ 68, 70-71 (1896) (Griffith, C)).
19. Id. at 349.
20. Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting
the Debate over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REv. 193, 194 (2013)
21. Id.
22. OPPORTUNITY NoT OPPORTUNISM, supra note 6, at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
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concept.2 6 Despite the Australian Government's decision to decline an
earlier implementation of an express duty of good faith, prior case law
shows conflicting judicial support of such an implied duty.27 For example,
Justice Finkelstein of the Federal Court of Australia wrote that "such a
term will ordinarily be implied; not as an ad hoc term ... but as a legal
incident of the relationship. '2 8 In addition, the New South Wales Court
of Appeal has opined that the law should always imply a duty of good
faith upon parties of contractual relationships. 29 But the High Court of
Australia has neither addressed the issue of implementing a duty of good
faith nor defined the standard, which further complicates the application
of the duty of good faith. 30 This uncertainty contributes to parties' con-
cerns when resolving disputes because even courts are unsure of exactly
what the good faith standard entails. 31 It will particularly disadvantage
franchisees, whom typically have less legal and economic resources at
their disposal.32
Other common law jurisdictions have statutorily provided for a duty of
good faith in the franchising context. For example, in the United States,
the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-304 provides that "every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance or enforcement. ' 33 In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts states that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is applied to both
parties in every contract.34 In declining to explicitly define the definition
of "good faith" within the revised Code, the Australian Government
chose to apply case law, impliedly inserting the standard within the con-
tractual relationship context.3 5 Similarly, the United States' statutes gov-
erning this duty also decline to provide a specific definition. The majority
view within the United States is to use a standard of honesty and reasona-
bleness when determining whether a breach of the duty of good faith
occurred. 36
26. Terry & Di Lernia, supra note 12, at 543.
27. Id. at 547-48.
28. Id. at 547 (quoting Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd
[1999] FCA 903 $ 34 (Finkelstein, Judge) (internal citations omitted)).
29. Andrew Stewart, Good Faith: A Necessary Element in Australian Employment
Law?, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 521, 541 (2011).
30. Terry & Di Lernia, supra note 12, at 548.
31. GnEss CONSULXING INT'L, supra note 16, at 3.
32. Id.
33. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONTRAcTS § 205 (1981).
35. GRAY & RPOLL, supra note 11, at 13.
36. Auto-Chlor Sys. of Minn. v. JohnsonDiversey, 328 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1006 (D. Minn.
2004).
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III. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH'S IMPACT ON
FRANCHISING RELATIONSHIPS
A. GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT SEEKS TO REDUCE UNEQUAL
BARGAINING POWER INHERENT DURING
PRE-CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
The Australian government's decision to add an express duty of good
faith applies to all phases of the franchise relationship, beginning with
negotiations between a franchisor and prospective franchisee. 37 The une-
qual bargaining power typically occurring between franchisors and fran-
chisees is of huge concern to the Australian government, so they will
apply the duty of good faith to negotiations and dealings before a con-
tract is signed in order to prevent one party from making material mis-
representations or omissions. In the 2013 review of the Code, the
Australian government also amended the duty to disclose information im-
posed upon the franchisor. 38 Franchisors must now provide prospective
franchisees with a list of risks and other matters they should be aware of
before entering a franchising agreement. 39
During pre-contractual negotiations, the duty to disclose will be based
on the good faith of both parties. But in reality, the franchisor will be the
party disclosing the most pertinent information and therefore also the
party most likely to breach the duty of good faith upon failure to dis-
close.40 This scenario has frequently played out in the U.S. court system
with the application of the Federal Trade Commission rule requiring dis-
closure within franchising and business opportunities.41
B. EFFECTING THE ONGOING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
The express duty of good faith will also have a significant impact on the
ongoing relationship between franchisors and franchisees. After signing
the franchising agreement, disputes ranging from contract interpretation
to required additional capital expenditure issues are likely to arise.
One of the additional recommendations accepted by the Australian
government is the requirement for franchisors to give franchisees the ba-
sis for additional capital improvements. 42 One implication of this re-
quirement is that franchisors must now include provisions requiring such
improvements within the franchising agreement. If franchisors fail to ex-
pressly include this provision within the agreement, they will have to sub-
sequently prove that such capital improvements are not
"unreasonable. ' 43 In addition, franchisors will now have to protect them-
37. GRAY & RIPOLL, supra note 11, at 13.
38. Id. at 8-9.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Re-
lationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 105, 109 (2004).
41. See 16 CFR § 436.1(d) (2007).
42. GRAY & RiPOLL, supra note 11, at 11-12.
43. Id. at 12.
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selves from claims by franchisees arguing that such improvements breach
their contractual duty to act in good faith. This will only complicate inter-
pretation disputes down the road because a franchise agreement alone
will provide the court with little guidance as to whether the franchisor's
requiring of a franchisee to build a new office space violates the terms of
the contract and the duty of good faith.44
An additional issue that commonly arises in jurisdictions with an ex-
press duty of good faith is whether a franchisor has the ability to waive
the duty of good faith within their franchising agreement and whether the
express terms of the agreement will supersede the good faith require-
ment.45 This situation commonly occurs when a franchisor attempts to
waive the duty of good faith to reduce their liabilities for franchisees'
conduct.46 The Australian government's decision to use the unwritten
law's definition of good faith, rather than to create an express definition
within the Code, will only exacerbate this dispute. The practice is also
used in the United States, where neither the Uniform Commercial Code
nor the Restatement (Second) of Contracts precisely defines good faith.
The benchmark used by U.S. courts to determine a breach of good faith is
the Restatement's definition of bad faith, which involves "violat[ing] the
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. '47 The
Australian courts will continue to apply the unwritten law to define good
faith in resolving franchise relationship disputes. But they will have to
provide more guidance on what constitutes breach to protect franchisees
that have less access to legal services when drafting contracts with
franchisors.
A court may also use the duty of good faith to interpret contracts with
ambiguous or omitted terms. For example, the court could forbid enforce-
ment of contracts that allow one party (usually the franchisor) to use its
inherent discretion to act unreasonably or outside the scope of the con-
tract.48 In addition, both the Australian government and United States
have stated that the duty of good faith aims to serve exactly those kinds
of contracts-where one party has the discretion to determine certain
terms of a contract.49
Because the Code has not previously required a duty of good faith in
Australian franchising agreements, the issue of waivers attempting to ex-
clude the duty of good faith has not been addressed in the Australian
court system. In the United States, however, there is still dispute as to
whether the covenant of good faith is mandatory and therefore a provi-
44. Carmen D. Caruso, Franchising's Enlightened Compromise: The Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 26 FRANCHI SE L.J. 207, 209 (2007).
45. Id. at 211.
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
48. Frank J. Cavico, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Franchise
Business Relationship, 6 BARRY L. REV. 61, 78-79 (2006).
49. Id. at 79.
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sion parties cannot contract around. 50 For this reason, many franchising
agreements written in the United States include provisions attempting to
revoke the duty to act in good faith, "except as may be provided by stat-
ute or regulation," knowing that the duty of good faith is an implied cove-
nant, rather than statutory principle. 51 It is likely Australian courts will
uphold the principle that the good faith requirement is binding because
unlike in the United States, the Australian Code expressly provides for an
obligation to act in good faith, rather than simply implying a covenant to
do so.
C. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH Is LIKELY TO RESULT IN INCREASED
LITIGATION BETWEEN A FRANCHISOR AND FRANCHISEE
The most likely repercussion of incorporating a duty of good faith into
franchising agreements will be a significant increase in litigation between
franchisors and franchisees claiming a breach of this duty. Franchisees
will likely supplement their lawsuits against franchisors with this claim
and franchisors will follow suit. As a result, the issue of whether express
terms of a franchising agreement, where applicable, will supersede the
duty of good faith and control the outcomes of such lawsuits will arise.
52
The Australian government's amendment to the Code will make the duty
of good faith binding upon every franchise agreement entered into. But
the issue may still arise as to whether contractual provisions in conflict
with the duty of good faith will prevail or be held unenforceable against
the franchisee.
The Government's decision to include an express duty of good faith in
the Code reflects their longstanding aim to improve franchise relation-
ships and neutralize the unequal bargaining positions of both parties.
53
But the Australian government's decision to apply unwritten law relating
to good faith to franchising agreements will likely cause confusion among
franchisors, franchisees, and even the courts. 54 In accepting the duty of
good faith recommendation, the Australian government also stated con-
cerns that "merely referring to the unwritten law will make it difficult for
parties without legal representation to appreciate what may be required
of them."'55 This obstacle will prove especially burdensome to franchis-
ees, which ordinarily have fewer resources and access to legal representa-
tion than their franchisor counterparts.
Franchisees, franchisors, and courts looking for guidance in determin-
ing what actions constitute a breach of the duty of good faith can look to
50. Kathryn Lea Harman, The Good Faith Gamble in Franchise Agreements: Does
Your Implied Covenant Trump My Express Term?, 28 CUMIB. L. Ri-v. 473, 478
(1997).
51. Caruso, supra note 44, at 207.
52. Id.
53. See GRAY & RIPOLL, supra note 11; OPOIRTUNITy Nor OPPORTUNISM, supra note
6.
54. GRAY & RIPOLL, supra note 11, at 13.
55. Id.
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case law that used the business unconscionability provision in 51AC of
the Trade Practices Act of 1974.56 That section of the Trade Practices Act
allows courts to determine if a party has acted unconscionably by factor-
ing in whether their actions were made in good faith.57 But the new
amendment creating an express duty of good faith should aid courts,
which have previously been in conflict over whether such a duty is pre-
sent in the franchising sector.58 The courts were primarily in dispute as to
whether an implied term of good faith is applicable in a commercial con-
tract, especially because such a term conflicts with common law principles
of caveat emptor.59 But, because the obligation of good faith will now be
statutorily required, the courts will have no other option but to impose
such obligation upon both parties to a franchise agreement.
D. DOES THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH BENEFIT THE FRANCHISEE, As
INTENDED By THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, OR THE FRANCHISOR?
The Australian government declared that the express duty of good
faith now applies to every franchising agreement with the hope that it will
benefit their growing franchise industry.60 A duty of good faith, on its
face, appears to benefit franchisees, typically small business owners who
are outdone in size and power by large franchisors looking to form agree-
ments most favorable to their concerns. But the Australian government
declined to provide a formal explicit definition within the Code and in-
stead decided to use the current case law on the implied duty of good
faith as a guide for franchisors and franchisees. 61 The Australian govern-
ment pointed out that because of this decision, parties without legal rep-
resentation would find it difficult to ascertain the true meaning of the
duty of good faith.62 Further complicating the effort to define an obliga-
tion of good faith is the fact that many requirements in the Code already
go beyond what traditional notions of good faith require. Examples of
this dilemma include the requirement for franchisors to disclose informa-
tion that may have been withheld for their own economic advantage and
to give notices of intended conduct. For this reason, some scholars have
suggested that it may have been better to prohibit intentional conduct
that is intended to injure the other party within their franchise
relationship.6 3
Adding to the ambiguity of this new amendment, previous case law has
conflicted on the extent of the duty of good faith's application. 64 For ex-
ample, one court found that McDonald's action in denying a current fran-
56. Terry & Di Lernia, supra note 12, at 545.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 546-47.
59. Id. at 549.
60. See GRAY & RIPOLL, supra note 11.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id.
63. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 40, at 198.
64. Terry & Di Lernia, supra note 12, at 561.
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chisee the ability to open a new store was not made in bad faith, but
rather an action taken in accord with its own legitimate business inter-
ests.65 Some courts, in deciding the standard for finding a breach of good
faith, have evaluated the intent of the franchisor's actions in making deci-
sions, while other courts have used a standard of requiring franchisees to
avoid conduct that would damage or destroy a franchisee's business.
66
The ambiguities present in both the updated Code and case law will be a
great concern to franchisees bringing suit against their franchisors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The duty of good faith is one of the most widely disputed, and ac-
cepted, notions of contract law around the world. Australia's recent
amendment providing for an explicit obligation of good faith in the
franchising sector further increases regulations in an already highly regu-
lated franchising industry. This amendment is important because it will
affect the way foreign and domestic franchisors conduct business in Aus-
tralia with their local franchisees. Although such a duty would seek to
equalize power among parties throughout all phases of the franchise rela-
tionship, U.S. case law covering similar ideals proves otherwise.
In order for Australia to continue growing their franchise industry,
there must be a more clearly defined duty of good faith. The Australian
government accepted Mr. Wein's recommendation for an express obliga-
tion of good faith, but declined to provide a specific definition within the
Code. As it stands, Australian case law addresses only the implied com-
mon law obligation of good faith, and court decisions vary widely regard-
ing the duty's application and measure of breach. When the obligation of
good faith becomes codified, Australian courts will likely see an increase
in litigation surrounding disputes among parties in a franchise relation-
ship. The majority of suits will probably be brought by franchisees, who
may use this duty to supplement other claims against their franchisor
counterparts. In addition, there will be more riding on these case deci-
sions, as the new Code will provide for civil pecuniary penalties for violat-
ing the obligation of good faith.67 The only guidance franchisors and
franchisees have in acting in accordance with the duty of good faith will
have to come out of court decisions. The average franchisor will have
more legal resources at their disposal to resolve these disputes and ensure
compliance during the ongoing franchise relationship. Most franchisees,
however, are local Australian citizens who don't have access to such re-
sources. Therefore, it appears that the inequality in bargaining power
sought to be decreased through an express obligation of good faith will
actually remain until the obligation of good faith is more clearly defined
through case law. Moving forward, it is wise for franchisees to define the
controlling obligation of good faith and the subsequent duties upon both
65. Id.
66. Id. at 562.
67. OPI'ORTUNrIY NOr OPI'OlFUNISM, supra, note 6, at 7.
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parties in a franchise agreement. This specificity can only help franchis-
ees narrow their opportunity for error during the ongoing relationship
and assist courts in resolving disputes between the parties. Overall, it
appears that the obligation of good faith will prove beneficial to the
franchisor relationship, but will require considerable common law devel-
opment with regards to its scope and application. Let the litigation begin.
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